Bertrand Russell says of Leibniz that "the best parts of his philosophy are the most abstract and the worst those which most nearly concern human life". Many have agreed with Russell's comments and the treatment of Leibniz by most Anglo-American philosophers in particular during this century is a testimony to his sentiments. Even sympathetic commentators have been dismissive or apologetic of those aspects of Leibniz's thought that "concern human life". My purpose here is not to dear Leibniz of (...) any and all animadversions - personal or philosophical - but to attempt to understand the dissimulation and equivocality that even his admirers ascribe to his non-logical writings. It is my position that such qualities were intrinsic to his thought, and not simply personal quirks or flaws that have to be tolerated or dismissed in any sustained examination of his philosophy. (shrink)

This paper presents an overview of the dimensions of unsafe motherhood, contrasting data from economically developed countries with some from developing countries. It addresses many common factors that shape unsafe motherhood, identifying medical, health system and societal causes, including women's powerlessness over their reproductive lives in particular as a feature of their dependent status in general. Drawing on perceptions of Jonathan Mann, it focuses on public health dimensions of maternity risks, and equates the role of bioethics in conscientious medical care (...) to that of human rights in public health care. The microethics of medical care translate into the macroethics of public health, but the transition compels some compromise of personal autonomy, a key feature of Western bioethics, in favour of societal analysis. Religiously‐based morality is seen to have shaped laws that contribute to unsafe motherhood. Now reformed in former colonizing countries of Europe, many such laws remain in effect in countries that emerged from colonial domination. UN conferences have defined the concept of ‘reproductive health’ as one that supports women's reproductive self‐determination, but restrictive abortion laws and practices epitomize the unjust constraints to which many women remain subject, resulting in their unsafe motherhood. Pregnant women can be legally compelled to give the resources of their bodies to the support of others, while fathers are not legally compellable to provide, for instance, bone‐marrow or blood donations for their children's survival. Women's unjust legal, political, economic and social powerlessness explains much unsafe motherhood and maternal mortality and morbidity. (shrink)

A well-known term in eighteenth-century literature and philosophy, the “beautiful soul” (die schöne Seele) has resurfaced in recent years. Deleuze refers to the beautiful soul’s “religiosity” and argues that aggressive “selection” is necessary as its antidote. However, in volatile contexts of social destabilization, such selection risks recoiling into reactionary violence. After first developing in more detail the beautiful soul’s background as a discursive figure, I argue that understanding Deleuze’s selection within a context of spiritual experience is necessary to mitigate this (...) worry. Exploration of this experience is pursued through juxtaposition of Deleuze’s thought with Nishida Kitarō’s investigation of the ontological structure of religious consciousness. The comparative resonances I develop suggest an ontological objectivity to the problems and structuring of the logos of religious consciousness and show how a more explicitly spiritual rendering of “selection,” developed through the Deleuze/Nishida encounter, intervenes into the broader beautiful soul problematic. (shrink)

I may venture to offer another belated suggestion on the text of Clement.

I may venture to offer another belated suggestion on the text of Clement.

The idiomatic use of ;xs1F24λλ' xs1F24 found in classical writers is familiar in Aristotle; but there is a set of passages for which the ordinary renderings of it fail, and the difficulty is such that the text has been suspected. Bonitz, for instance, Index Aristotelicus, 33b2O, says of two of these passages, Pol. 1257b21, Metaph. 1038a 14, that xs22EFλλxs22EF is enough by itself, or even that xs22EFλλxs22EF without xs1F24 seems required , and it has been proposed in the second of (...) these places to read xs1F96 for xs1F24. It must be contended that the text is sound in all the difficult passages in question. (shrink)

The excellent article in the January number of the Classical Quarterly upon a mistaken interpretation of Philebus 31 c contains the somewhat incorrect statement that this interpretation is the general one: and the article itself is anticipated by a short note in a paper which I published in the Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society for 1881–2. I have nothing to complain of, for it may partly serve me right. Besides, my paper, though duly registered in the Revue de Philologie, (...) is omitted from the index of that periodical; the aforesaid Transactions are out of print, and by some mischance my correction of the wrong rendering did not appear in the last edition of Jowett's Plato, though Jowett intended it should. (shrink)

The excellent article in the January number of the Classical Quarterly upon a mistaken interpretation of Philebus 31 c contains the somewhat incorrect statement that this interpretation is the general one: and the article itself is anticipated by a short note in a paper which I published in the Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society for 1881–2. I have nothing to complain of, for it may partly serve me right. Besides, my paper, though duly registered in the Revue de Philologie, (...) is omitted from the index of that periodical; the aforesaid Transactions are out of print, and by some mischance my correction of the wrong rendering did not appear in the last edition of Jowett's Plato, though Jowett intended it should. (shrink)

In the last number of the Journal of Philology a change of punctuation in Sophist 244 C, together with a new interpretation, is proposed. To this serious exception must be taken; or perhaps not too serious, because the proposal can hardly be due to anything but haste and want of revision.It is not only in disagreement with a familiar idiom, but is easily seen to be inconsistent with the context, which can have barely received attention.The passage is as follows: ξE.

ABSTRACTThe article explores the connection between James's “radical empiricism” and Deleuze's “transcendental empiricism” with a particular focus on the concept of “pure experience.” It argues for the substantial nature of this connection in terms of both philosophical motivations and formal innovations. Both thinkers are motivated to construct “better” empiricisms that do not complacently accept conventional conceptual representations as exhaustive of the real. Moreover, radical empiricism develops a latent critique of representational models of consciousness that is accomplished through a turn to (...) events or processes as ontologically primary. These innovations are further developed by Deleuze in his treatment of the problem of individuation. Taken together, they help to specify the metaphysical reasons for the experimental pluralism that both James and Deleuze affirm, showing how these reasons are inextricable from the radical empiricist impulse to be maximally inclusive of modalities of real experience, including the felt, the vague, and the affective. Emphasizing the metaphysical dimensions of these alternative empiricisms brings into clearer focus the stakes of philosophical thought as part of the open-ended and ongoing relational processes by which the universe continues to unfold. (shrink)

The article explores the connection between James's " radical empiricism " and Deleuze's " transcendental empiricism " with a particular focus on the concept of " pure experience. " It argues for the substantial nature of this connection in terms of both philosophical motivations and formal innovations. Both thinkers are motivated to construct " better " empiricisms that do not complacently accept conventional conceptual representations as exhaustive of the real. Moreover, radical empiricism develops a latent critique of representational models of (...) consciousness that is accomplished through a turn to events or processes as ontologically primary. These innovations are further developed by Deleuze in his treatment of the problem of individuation. Taken together, they help to specify the metaphysical reasons for the experimental pluralism that both James and Deleuze affirm, showing how these reasons are inextricable from the radical empiricist impulse to be maximally inclusive of modalities of real experience, including the felt, the vague, and the affective. Emphasizing the metaphysical dimensions of these alternative empiricisms brings into clearer focus the stakes of philosophical thought as part of the open-ended and ongoing relational processes by which the universe continues to unfold. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on an internal tension within James’s Principles and suggest that its formal structure provides useful insight into James’s subsequent evolution. Specifically, through a close reading of James’s account of ‘conceptions’ in the Principles, I examine the tension between these ‘conceptions’ construed as discrete and self-identical and James’s famous phenomenological description of consciousness as a continuous stream. Such a tension primarily involves the intersection of an epistemic need (or condition of possibility) with a quasi-metaphysical intuition or (...) postulate (continuity). Importantly, this tension is intensified by the methodological constraints of bracketing metaphysical questions which James sets for himself in the Principles. James’s decision to deny the cogency of this methodological bracketing can therefore be read as his response to the tension I examine and his speculative turn to “radical empiricism” as an attempt to resolve epistemological difficulties by going more radical ontologically. Doing so raises questions about the status of speculative metaphysics in intersection with empirical inquiry. (shrink)

This paper studies “environmental personhood” legislation as a transitional concept. A transitional concept is one whose originating context sets parameters for its pragmatic functioning even as the eventual coherence of this functioning entails deep change in this originating context. By more explicitly thematizing environmental personhood as a transitional concept, we can acknowledge worries about its entanglement with a rights paradigm emphasizing private property and human exceptionalism while still exploring how it might contribute towards deeper ecological transformation. The paper introduces Nuu-chah-nuulth (...) philosopher E. Richard Atleo’s notion of ‘phase connectors’ as a heuristic for thinking transitional tensions in environmental personhood especially in terms of the gap between its present operative strategy and possible future effects on wider imaginaries. Indeed, this gap indicates how environmental personhood’s transitional potential is entangled with challenging dominant presuppositions in what Anna Grear calls ‘law’s onto-epistemic imaginary’. Using Atleo’s heuristic and drawing on a range of sources, the paper thinks through some of the prominent fault lines and volatile dynamics of environmental personhood as a transitional concept. After establishing these critical tensions, it considers how its conceptualization in domains beyond legislative or academic articulations may or may not help induce ethico-phenomenological changes in constitutive imaginaries. Though such popular presentations are frequently reductive, understanding why and how is important if theorists can contribute to the construction of creative alternatives. (shrink)

Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” and the “empirical side” of Whitehead’s metaphysics are paradoxical unless placed in the context of their unorthodox readings of empiricism. I explore this context focusing on their engagements with Hume. Both subvert presumptions of a categorical gap between external nature and internal human experience and open possibilities for a speculative empiricism that is non-reductive while still affirming experience as source for philosophical thinking. Deleuze and Whitehead follow Hume in beginning with events of sensation as primary but do (...) not presume the logic of (human) subjects and objects (of nature) as necessary structuring polarities for their interpretation. This challenges a basic distinction (between inner and outer or between self and world) that seems inherent in the ordinary concept of experience, thus earning the moniker speculative. The speculative empiricist studies how these abstractions arise from events of experience prior to their consolidation in representation. This includes a critical component: to what extent do unexamined assumptions about conceptual abstraction hinder, block, or prefigure experiential attention? This critical component has existential implications for how we attend to the affective, intuitive, and preconceptual. (shrink)

This commentary considers Wahl’s 1942 “Poetry as Spiritual Exercise” in the context of his interests in radical empiricism and process metaphysics. In doing so, it raises appreciation for the complexity of his thought, identifies specific notes of influence on Gilles Deleuze, and responds to worries that Wahl’s notion of spiritual exercise is predominantly a form of withdrawal, quietism, or retreat from the horrors of World War Two. For Wahl, rather than passive contemplation of a determinate artifact, poetry is a mode (...) of experience that, to speak with Whitehead and James, is a making. This experience of poetry develops affordances of thought that strengthen existential capacity for remaining open to uncertainty, fragility, and vulnerability. (shrink)

This paper explores one means of connection between Whitehead and Deleuze through an investigation into the figure of the ‘beautiful soul’. I first examine Deleuze’s claim that a philosophy of difference risks a ‘new’ version of the beautiful soul, situating this figure in its historical context in Hegel. I then consider why Whitehead may initially appear to fall into the trap of the beautiful soul before arguing that this is not the case. Seeing how brings Whitehead and Deleuze closer together (...) by showing that their respective insistences on the risks, dangers, and adventures integral to speculative thinking highlight the importance of the intersection between the existential and the metaphysical. (shrink)

This paper explores one means of connection between Whitehead and Deleuze through an investigation into the figure of the ‘beautiful soul’. I first examine Deleuze's claim that a philosophy of difference risks a ‘new’ version of the beautiful soul, situating this figure in its historical context in Hegel. I then consider why Whitehead may initially appear to fall into the trap of the beautiful soul before arguing that this is not the case. Seeing how brings Whitehead and Deleuze closer together (...) by showing that their respective insistences on the risks, dangers, and adventures integral to speculative thinking highlight the importance of the intersection between the existential and the metaphysical. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJason Wirth's Mountains, Rivers, and the Great Earth: Reading Gary Snyder and Dōgen in an Age of Ecological Crisis challenges complacency in two significant ways. First, it performs a commitment to philosophy as creative and capacious practice in contrast to orthodoxies or technical provincialisms. Second, it disrupts unreflective usages of “wealth” and “development” as inherently economic in developing a compelling argument about the way that spiritual poverty informs contemporary ecological pathology. In this review, I present six key claims in Wirth's (...) text and offer unfolding thoughts in response. (shrink)

Michela Bella’s Ontology after Philosophical Psychology: The Continuity of Consciousness in William James’s Philosophy of Mind offers a detailed survey of James’s thought using “continuity” as its focal lens. Because the book presumes significant familiarity with James and frequently includes dense exegesis of his work’s most technical aspects, it is primarily for specialists. It will particularly interest James scholars studying the entanglement of the metaphysical with the psychological and epistemological.Combining “historical” and “theoretical” points of view, Bella tracks “James’s gradual translation (...) of psychological experimental observations of the continuity of thought into an ontological perspective... (shrink)

Rorty's aversion to metaphysics is well known, so the extent of his early work on Whitehead might come as a surprise. This article examines the young Rorty's critical assessment of Whitehead to show how it demonstrates the consequences of diverging metaphilosophical orientations. It argues that Rorty's insistence on judging Whitehead's work through an exclusively epistemological frame causes him to miss its more radical existential and epistemic implications. After examining how Rorty and Whitehead operate with different cost-benefit analyses as to the (...) risks and benefits of speculative philosophy, it suggests that closer attention to the fuller stakes of Whitehead's project shows that his metaphysics are not opposed to the “poeticized” culture that Rorty calls for, one where the distinction between making and finding is no longer metaphysically foundational. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between James’ radical empiricism and Deleuze’s study of the genesis of sense without a transcendental subject as necessary condition. It shows that James’ concept of pure experience changes the form of relation between mind and world. Considering how to conceptualize experience without a fixed metaphysical or transcendental subject destabilizes ontological identity, leads to a founding conceptual divergence from traditional phenomenology, and motivates Deleuze’s efforts towards transcendental empiricism. The paper reads Deleuze’s work on the genesis of (...) sense in this context, arguing that one important result is an ontological pluralism. Such pluralism is crucial in considering how meaning can be made between and across differences and is in keeping with radical empiricism’s openness to life’s complexity. (shrink)